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ABSTRACT
In many parts of the country, hydraulic fracturing has brought energy
development onto people’s doorsteps. Efforts by local governments to
employ traditional land use mechanisms to study and mitigate some of
the impacts of these latest intrusions have erupted into battles over the
scope of statewide agencies’ control.
Forgotten in this fray are many renewable energy resources. As a
general rule, they are not subject to statewide oversight, and
consequently renewable energy providers must navigate the myriad of
siting and permitting requirements of local jurisdictions. For several
years, scholars have urged more statewide renewable energy siting
procedures to level the playing field. California is the national leader in
renewable energy deployment, yet its statewide energy commission does
not have jurisdiction over the siting of photovoltaic solar or wind energy
plants. This article explores when statewide siting is beneficial and when
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it may be contraindicated, making a case for consolidation of all largescale siting under the purview of California’s “superagency,” the
California Energy Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION
The struggle to determine the most appropriate level of regulation is age-old:
should federal law preempt the laws of the states and should state law preempt
local control? Local authority prevails for those who believe that democratic
1
governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed,” that
2
“the government closest to the people serves the people best.”
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has reawakened this tension between state
3
and local control in several states. As just one example, in the fall of 2014,
Coloradoans faced the prospect of up to a dozen ballot initiatives addressing the
power of local governments to restrict fracking operations within their
4
jurisdictions. Although Colorado’s governor convinced proponents to
temporarily withdraw their initiative campaigns by creating a task force to
5
consider solutions, now that the task force has made its recommendations,
6
dissatisfied proponents of local control have renewed their initiative threats.

1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Thomas Jefferson embraced this concept
from JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Alexander Campbell Fraser ed., Dover
Publications 1959) (1690).
2. Greg Overstreet, Re-Empowering the Native American: A Conservative Proposal to Restore Tribal
Sovereignty and Self-Reliance to Federal Indian Policy, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (1993) (citing
Pub. Papers of Ronald Reagan 96 (Jan. 24, 1983)); see also Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address in
Washington, D.C., para. 4 (Mar. 4, 1801), available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres16.html/ (“[Y]ou
should understand what I deem the essential principles of our Government, and consequently those which ought
to shape its Administration. I will compress them within the narrowest compass they will bear . . . .”).
3. See, e.g., John R. Nolon & Steven E. Galvin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, Local Power, and
Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995 (2012–2013); Robert H. Freilich, Neil M. Popowitz,
Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal Regulation Does not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation,
44 URB. LAW. 533 (2012); Sorell E. Negro, Fracking Wars: Federal, State and Local Conflicts over the
Regulation of Natural Gas Activities, 35 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT (No. 2 Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.ourenergypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fracking-Wars.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); Michelle L. Kennedy, Exercise of Local Control over Gas Extraction, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 375 (2010–2011).
4. Lynn Bartels, Big Spenders Energize Fight over Initiatives, DENVER POST, May 12, 2014, at 1A; see
also Mark Jaffe & Aldo Svaldi, Battles Over Local Control Energized, DENVER POST, May 1, 2014, at 1A.
5. Maeve Reston, Deal Will Keep Fracking Battle Off Colorado Ballot, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-pn-colorado-deal-fracking-ballot-20140804story.html#page=1 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Mark Jaffe, Hickenlooper Compromise
Keeps Oil and Gas Measures Off Colorado Ballot, DENVER POST, Aug. 4, 2014, http://www.denverpost.
com/business/ci_26272493/hickenlooper-tries-broker-last-minute-deal-oil-gas-colorado (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
6. Task Force Proposes Fracking Rules to Colorado Governor, NPR (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.
npr.org/2015/02/27/389454418/task-force-proposes-fracking-rules-to-colorado-governor (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); see also Bruce Finley, Colorado Anti-Fracking Groups Launch Campaign for
Statewide Ban, DENVER POST, Feb. 24, 2015, http://www.denverpost.com/environment/ci_27591553/colorado-
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These measures reflected the state legislature’s failure to resolve escalating turf
battles and lawsuits over the authority of the statewide Colorado Oil and Gas
7
Conservation Commission to preempt such local control.
Forgotten in this fray is the fact that renewable energy resources in a majority
of states have no comparable statewide agency to facilitate the siting and
8
regulatory processes. Many have argued that a “one-stop” procedure would help
mitigate the risks and delays that jeopardize renewable resources under the
9
current decentralized siting process. Because California has a statewide energy
agency that provides a siting process for most energy generation facilities but not
10
for wind or photovoltaic (PV) solar power, this article will examine the impact
11
of moving to a “superagency” solution for these resources in California.
Part II provides an overview of energy siting processes in most states. Part III
describes the forces that led to the creation of California’s superagency, the
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission, also called the
California Energy Commission (Energy Commission), and the scope of the
Energy Commission’s jurisdiction. Part IV explains the Energy Commission’s
siting process and its advantages over the current process required for most
renewable projects in California. With compelling arguments for why large-scale
renewables should be included under Energy Commission jurisdiction, this

anti-fracking-groups-launch-campaign-statewide-ban (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. Bartels, supra note 4, at 1A; see generally K.K. DuVivier, Sins of the Father, 1 TEX. A&M J. REAL
PROP. L. 391, 400–09 (2014) (describing the evolution of laws surrounding oil and gas).
8. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy A Reality—Finding Ways to Site Wind Power
Facilities, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 635, 672–77 (2008) (describing the varied approaches to
wind power facility siting).
9. See, e.g., Brian Troxler, Note, Stifling the Wind: California Environmental Quality Act and Local
Permitting, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 163, 171 (2013) (arguing that a centralized state agency would be
preferable to local control); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 679–80 (arguing for a “lead” state agency to oversee
wind and energy facility siting); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and
Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1049, 1065–71, 1076–79, 1092
(2009) (describing local, state, and federal regulation of wind development and resulting challenges to
development and arguing for a “federal wind siting policy”); Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable
Governance, 35 HARV. ENVT. L. REV. 477, 528–38 (2011) (describing the multiple layers of regulation and
property rights that apply to large renewable developments and arguing for regional energy boards).
10. See Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL PUB. RES.
CODE § 25120 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (indicating that wind, hydroelectric, and solar photovoltaic facilities
are not considered thermal power plants for the purposes of the Act). Currently, there are two primary
technologies for solar energy generation: solar thermal and solar photovoltaics (PV). PV involves the direct
conversion of light into electricity through the photoelectric effect. When PV materials absorb light, they
release electrons. The electrons are captured by conductors, creating an electric current. This results in solar PV
energy. See Gil Knier, How Do Photovoltaics Work?, NASA SCIENCE NEWS (last updated Apr. 6, 2011),
http://science.nasa.gov/science-news/science-at-nasa/2002/solarcells/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
11. See Superagency for the Energy Gap, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1973, available at http://www.energy.
ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing the formation of the Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission in the
1970s).

191

2014 / The Superagency Solution
Article concludes by urging California to shoulder its role-model status by
12
making this change.
II. ENERGY SITING PROCESSES
“[T]he right to use the land and its natural resources” is generally within a
13
14
state’s police power and delegated to local governments. This “traditional
15
state-to-local delegation of land use authority” changed in the 1970s. Electric
utilities conducted studies in the 1960s that showed “annual industrial growth of
seven to eight percent—a rate that would require ‘the doubling of electric
16
generating capacity every ten years.’” Some of these studies also “concluded
that nuclear power plants would provide electricity at substantially cheaper rates
17
than coal-fired plants.”
Nuclear power was not popular with segments of the public, so “the National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners developed a model siting
18
19
statute” “to speed construction of nuclear power plants.” Several states
responded by creating state-level agencies to “streamline challenges to site
20
approvals” and “prevent parochial preference from blocking new power plants.”
Twenty states now have some mandatory state agency control of energy
facility siting: “Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, [and]
21
Wisconsin.” However, a number of states with statewide agencies regulating
some power plant siting do not include renewable energy siting within those

12. Although an argument could be made that smaller energy projects should also be a part of the
integrated planning process, this article focuses on facilities comparable to those currently under Energy
Commission siting authority which must be at least 50 megawatts (MW). See infra notes 82–85 and
accompanying text (describing the Energy Commission’s jurisdiction).
13. John R. Nolon, Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to
Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 821, 821 (2006).
14. Daniel R. Mandelker, Fred Bosselman’s Legacy to Land Use Reform, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
11, 13 (2001).
15. Uma Outka, The Renewable Energy Footprint, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 257–58 (2011).
16. Paul Rodgers & Charles D. Gray, State Commission Treatment of Nuclear Plant Cancellation Costs,
13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443, 444 n.6 (1985) (quoting Pat Wechsler, Nuclear Power: Who Foots the Bill?, DUN’S
BUS. MONTH, June 1984, at 70–71) (citing Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 88).
17. Id. at 444 n.7 (citing ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR PLANT
CANCELLATIONS: CAUSES, COSTS, AND CONSEQUENCES 28 (Apr. 1983)).
18. Outka, supra note 15, at 257.
19. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, UNITED PRESS, May 22, 1974, available at http://www.
energy.ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
20. Outka, supra note 15, at 258.
21. Id. “[M]any of the states with centralized authorities afford one-stop permitting for very large
facilities only. North Dakota and Massachusetts, for example, certify energy facilities greater than 100 MW,
while New York’s threshold is 80 MW, Florida’s is 75 MW, Ohio’s is 50 MW . . . .” Id. at 266 n.127.
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22

agencies’ jurisdictions. Below is a summary of the current status of wind
23
24
generation siting processes. Fewer statewide agencies address solar PV.
25
26
First, at least ten states have statewide siting authority over large-scale
27
28
29
30
wind energy generation: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
31
32
33
34
35
36
Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, and Vermont.

22. Hannah Wiseman et al., Formulating a Law of Sustainable Energy: The Renewables Component, 28
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 827, 871–72 (2011).
23. It is beyond the scope of this particular Article to cover the full range and current state of all 50 states’
utility siting regimes. The text of this Article generally sets out Ronald H. Rosenberg’s analysis. See Rosenberg,
supra note 8, at 673–77 (setting forth the various approaches to state siting processes). Alternatively, Hannah
Wiseman, Lindsay Grisamer, and E. Nichole Saunders note that there are “three core types of municipal
governance approaches to renewable technologies (banning, ignoring, or specifically addressing renewables)
[and] four different types of state regimes”: (1) fully centralized, preempting local authority; (2) hybrid regimes
with “centralized approval . . . and partial preemption . . . directing municipalities to include minimum
requirements”; (3) hybrid regimes with “a centralized siting process[,] but leav[ing] zoning to” locals, some
with “optional preemption of local zoning powers”; and (4) regimes “leav[ing] nearly all regulation of
renewable development to” local governments. Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 881–82.
24. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Energy’s Solar America Cities Program, the U.S. Department of
Energy’s SunShot Initiative that address some of the challenges solar PV faces. California has made a shortterm exception for utility-scale solar PV. See infra Part III.B.
25. Rosenberg lists seven: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, and
Virginia. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 676–77. See infra note 40 about Virginia.
26. Note from the statutes in the following citations that the size of facilities large enough to warrant
statewide siting supervision varies from state to state. See infra notes 27–36. In addition to the ten listed here,
Brian Troxler lists Rhode Island as “regulating state siting of wind project of forty MW or more.” Troxler,
supra note 9, 190 n.219. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-98-1 to -20 (2006 & Supp. 2010) regulates the siting of “major
energy facilities,” which are those capable of operating at 40 MW or more, but wind facilities are not
specifically mentioned in the siting statute.
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-50kk (2013) (authorizing the Connecticut Siting Council to adopt
regulations for the siting of wind turbines).
28. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, §§ 3451–3459 (2010 & Supp. 2013). The act became effective in
2008 and designates the Department of Environmental Protection as the primary siting authority for grid-scale
wind energy development in organized areas of the state. Id. tit. 35-A, § 3451(8). The Maine Land Use Planning
Commission may also designate expedited permitting areas in the State’s unorganized and deorganized areas
and is the primary siting authority for wind energy developments that are not grid-scale and that are in the
unorganized and deorganized areas. Id.
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, §§1, 69H (West 2003) (designating the Energy Facilities Siting
Board as the siting authority for energy generating facilities). Section 1 has existed since 1973. Id. ch. 164, § 1.
In 1997, a definition of “renewable energy,” which included wind, was added to section 1. 1997 Mass. Legis.
Serv. ch. 164 (West). In 2008, a definition of “alternative energy development,” which includes wind, was also
added to section 1. 2008 Mass. Legis. Serv. ch. 169 (West).
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 216F.01.2, 216F.04, 216F.07 (West 2010) (requiring all large wind energy
conversation systems to obtain a site permit from the Public Utilities Commission and preempting any local
authority to issue such permits). Chapter 216F, entitled “Wind Energy Conversion Systems,” was first enacted
in 1995, with amendments in 2004, 2007, and 2008. Id. § 216F.01–.09. It preempts local regulations and zoning
ordinances for wind projects over a certain size with a permit system administered by the Minnesota Public
Utilities Commission. Id. §§ 216F.04, 216F.07
31. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 704.820–.900 (West 2014) (requiring the Nevada Public Utilities
Commission to site wind facilities greater than seventy MW). Section 704.7811, including wind in the
definition of “[r]enewable energy” was add ed in 2001. Id. § 704.7811. The definition was incorporated into
section 704.860 defining “[u]tility facility” in 2005 along with provisions for net metering. 2005 Nev. Legis.
Serv. ch. 425 (West).
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Second, at least five states have a “State/Local Government Hybrid
Approach” with respect to wind resources: California, Montana, New Mexico,
37
Washington, and Wisconsin. These approaches include technical assistance
from the state or shared responsibility through voluntary guidelines, model
38
ordinances, and power siting rules following state models.
Finally, aside from the fifteen states listed in the previous two categories,
most of the rest of the country uses “[l]ocal [g]overnment [c]ontrol [t]hrough
[c]onventional [l]and [u]se [c]ontrols and [p]rocedures” to regulate the siting of
39
wind or solar PV generation facilities. Some states have recently shifted from

32. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 162-H:2 to -H:4 (2014) (providing that the New Hampshire Site Evaluation
Committee regulate the siting of wind facilities over thirty MW and allowing smaller facilities to opt in to state
regulation to preempt local regulation) A definition of “[r]enewable energy facility” was added to section 162H:2 in 2007. 2008 N.H Laws ch. 364. The definition includes facilities “powered by wind energy.” Id. § 162H:2.
33. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4906.01-.99 (2014) (regulating the installation of facilities with a capacity
of fifty MW or more). Section 4906.13, was amended to define “economically significant wind farm,” in 2008.
2008 Ohio Legis. Serv. Ann. ch. 120 (West). Section 4906.98, also amended in 2008, added “economically
significant wind farm” to the permit requirement for “major utility facilities.” Id. Section 4906.20, which
regulates “[e]conomically significant wind farms,” was added in 2008 and applies to facilities with an aggregate
capacity of between five and fifty MW. Id. Larger facilities would be subject to the utility-siting provisions
applicable to “major utility facilities” in sections 4906.01-.99. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.01. See also id.
§ 713.081 (effective June 24, 2008) (giving local governments siting and other regulatory authority over
“[s]mall wind farms,” which are facilities that operate at an aggregate capacity of less than five MW.)
34. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 469.300(11)(J), 469.320, 469.401 (West 2003 & Supp. 2014) (providing for
statewide site certification of wind power facilities with a capacity of thirty-five MW or more, with a provision
allowing facilities with less capacity to opt in to state certification, after which local governments must issue
their permits subject to the conditions contained in the site certificate). The definition of “[e]nergy facility” in
section 469.300 was amended in 2001 to include “[a]n electric power generating plant with an average electric
generating capacity of 35 megawatts or more if the power is produced from . . . wind energy . . . .” Or. Legis.
Serv. ch. 134 (2001). Section 469.320 was amended in 2001 to permit facilities generating less than 35 MW
from wind to opt in to the site certificate program. Id. ch. 683 (2001).
35. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 49-41B-1 to -38 (2015) (providing for statewide siting of wind projects with
100 MW capacity or more). In 2005, the definition of “[f]acility” was amended to include “wind energy
facility,” and a definition of “[w]ind energy facility” was added to the statute. 2005 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 250.
The term was also inserted into other relevant provisions in the siting statute. Id.
36. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248 (West 2014) (requiring the Vermont Public Service Board to site all
wind energy facilities except those for on-site energy consumption). In 2009, this section was amended to
include subsection (o), which provides that a petition for a wind energy generation facility cannot be rejected as
incomplete if it does not specify information about the turbines. 2009 Vt. Legis. Serv. ch. 45 (West). This is the
only mention of wind in § 248, which suggests that wind-generation facilities were always included in the siting
statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 248. See also id. tit. 3 § 2840 (West 2014) (enacted May 27, 2009)
(authorizing the siting of wind energy generation facilities on state lands.)
37. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675–76. Note that WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.010 to .904 (West
2001 & Supp. 2014) includes a 2007 amendment to § 80.50.020 that added “alternative energy resource”
(which includes wind facilities) to the definition of “energy facilities” subject to the statewide siting statute
requiring the Energy Facility Site Evaluation Council to site all facilities over 350 MW and allowing renewable
facilities to opt into the state process rather than use the local permitting process. 2007 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch.
325 (West); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 80.50.060.
38. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675–76.
39. See id. at 673 (specifically listing “Oregon, Illinois, Kansas . . . , Texas, Idaho, North Carolina, New
Hampshire, Iowa, Utah, Nevada, and Colorado”); Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 871 (“The majority of states
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40

statewide siting to local control. Thus, these states regulate project siting with
41
zoning and land use control law under traditional local police powers.
If a community favors a renewable energy project, then delegation of power
42
at this local level can expedite permitting and siting. While promoting clean
energy generally appears to be a good thing for all involved, both locally and
globally, the decision requires a careful balancing of “economic, environmental,
43
and safety concerns.” With limited budgets to hire experts, it is likely that “local
land use planning officials could be overwhelmed by sophisticated applicants and
their consultants, leading to quick project approval with limited analysis and few
44
protective conditions.”
More problematic for energy development companies (and the climate,
assuming it benefits from cleaner energy sources) is the possibility that a clean
energy project will be challenged or completely blocked at the local level based
45
on emotions rather than facts. Consequently, the public may benefit from
having a statewide agency to make decisions following consistent criteria and
46
with the expertise to consider both local and extra-local benefits.
47
Finally, the challenges of addressing a panoply of different regulations and
the vagaries of unpredictable and lengthy local processes can create stifling, if
not suffocating, risks that drive up costs and make it impossible for renewable
energy generation to compete with conventional energy sources for investment

have not preempted local authority over the siting of utility-scale renewable generation . . . .”); id. at 842 (“The
current legal system that governs renewable energy development consists of an incoherent patchwork of
statutes, regulations, and common law court decisions geared toward older, nonrenewable technologies.”). See
generally Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J. Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. 877 (2011) (arguing for
local control of renewable energy projects); Uma Outka, Siting Renewable Energy: Land Use and Regulatory
Context, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1041 (2010) (discussing renewable energy siting law in Florida); Donald Zillman et
al., More Than Tilting At Windmills, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 10 (2009) (describing the “array of local policies
and regulations” that may apply to wind farm siting).
40. See, for example, the state of Virginia. In 2008, Rosenberg listed Virginia among the states with a
state-controlled siting process. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 676. However, in 2011, VA. CODE ANN. § 67-103
(West 2014) was enacted, stating that local governments can develop ordinances for the siting of renewable
energy facilities generating electricity from wind and that the local ordinances must be consistent with the
Commonwealth’s energy policy.
41. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 673.
42. See Alexa Burt Engelman, Against the Wind: Conflict over Wind Energy Siting, 41 ENVTL. L. REP.
10549, 10561 (2011) (noting that “early and effective engagement of the affected public” may result in less
opposition to siting proposals).
43. Troxler, supra note 9, at 171.
44. Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 675.
45. See, e.g., Engelman, supra note 42, at 10556–59 (describing the battle that erupted in Hammond, New
York over wind energy development).
46. See Outka, supra note 15, at 305–06 (arguing that siting decisions must be made in light of
“cumulative, not just site-specific, impacts”); Rosenberg, supra note 8, at 679 (arguing that a state agency is the
most appropriate body to site wind energy facilities because it is in the best position to assess state and regional
interests).
47. Troxler, supra note 9, at 171–72 (describing the “high transaction costs of navigating through a
regulatory maze” of local regulations).
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48

dollars. Centralized, state-level siting authority could address all of these cost,
49
expertise, efficiency, and environmental concerns. The following Part III
describes California’s state-level energy agency, which might serve as a role
model for other states.
III. CALIFORNIA’S ENERGY “SUPERAGENCY”
With over 38 million people in 2013, California is by far the most populous
50
51
state in America. Texas is a distant second with about 26.4 million. New York
52
and Florida are vying for third place with around 19.6 million each. By 2050,
53
California is projected to have a population of 50 million.
54
In terms of gross domestic product, California is also a global giant. In
2012, California was “in a virtual tie” with the Russian Federation and Italy, each
55
with an economy of approximately $2 trillion. In 2013, California was poised to
56
surpass these two countries to rank as the eighth largest economy in the world.
57
58
By almost every measure, California is a national and world leader with
59
respect to energy. California is also a leader in terms of renewable energy.
48. See generally id. at 177–88 (describing the cost to wind energy developers of complying with CEQA
and decentralized siting requirements).
49. See id. at 188 (concluding that state-controlled siting “would alleviate the uncertainty surrounding
permitting, which would in turn alleviate investment barriers without sacrificing environmental review”).
50. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last
visited June 30, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, CALIFORNIA @ 50
MILLION: CALIFORNIA’S CLIMATE FUTURE 8 (drft. 2013), available at http://opr.ca.gov/docs/EGPR_Review
Draft.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA @ 50 MILLION] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
54. See California Posed to Move Up in World Economic Rankings in 2013, NUMBERS IN THE NEWS
(Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy, Palo Alto, Cal.), July 2013, at 1, available at
http://www.ccsce.com/PDF/Numbers-July-2013-CA-Economy-Rankings-2012.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (comparing the largest economies in the world, including California).
55. Id.
56. Id. Only the following 7 countries were ahead of California: United States ($15.7 trillion); China
($8.2 trillion); Japan ($6 trillion); Germany ($3.4 trillion); France ($2.6 trillion); UK ($2.4 trillion); Brazil ($2.3
trillion)). Id.
57. See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUB. NO. CEC-100-2013-001-CMF, 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY
POLICY REPORT 1 (2013), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-100-2013-001/CEC100-2013-001-CMF.pdf [hereinafter 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (“California continues to lead the nation in designing and implementing innovative policies an
strategies to use energy more efficiently, replace fossil fuels with renewable resources, and develop the
infrastructure needed to deliver safe, reliable, and affordable energy to consumers and businesses throughout the
state”); CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, PUB. NO. CEC-150-2011-002-LCF-REV1, RENEWABLE POWER IN
CALIFORNIA: STATUS AND ISSUES 22 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2011publications/
CEC-150-2011-002/CEC-150-2011-002-LCF-REV1.pdf [hereinafter 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY
REPORT] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“In 1980, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . .
followed California’s lead by adopting the requirement for standard contracts priced at full avoided cost for
utility purchases of electricity from qualifying facilities.”).
58. See 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 35 (describing how California’s
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According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, California is ranked
first for installed capacity of solar PV, concentrating solar power, and
60
geothermal, and is second for biomass and hydropower. In addition, California
61
was number one for installed wind energy capacity in 2000, but it has since
languished in comparison to a twentyfold growth nationwide, primarily in more
62
regulatory-friendly states. Currently, wind power generation is not regulated by
the statewide Energy Commission, but an argument can be made that moving it
63
under the auspices of that agency might improve its success.
The following subparts describe first the creation of the Energy Commission
and second the scope of its jurisdiction.
A. Creation of the California Energy Commission
The Energy Commission was created in 1974 through the Warren-Alquist
64
Act. Faced with the prospect of up to 120 new nuclear reactors to meet
65
California’s projected energy needs by 2000, the State Assembly figured out a
way to meet the needs of both utility companies and constituents urging

actions influence China and the rest of the world); id. at 309 (calling California a “world leader in its efforts to
address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions”). California’s Low Carbon Fuel
Standard, established in 2007, aims to significantly reduce California’s contributions to worldwide Greenhouse
Gas emission levels. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 24.
59. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, 2011
RENEWABLE ENERGY DATA BOOK 31 (2013), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy13osti/54909.pdf (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (ranking California in the top three states for “Renewable Electricity Installed
Capacity” in all six energy categories discussed).
60. Id.
61. Troxler, supra note 9, at 163 (observing that “California led the nation in installed wind energy
capacity” in 2000, with over 1,600 MW of the nation’s total installed wind energy capacity of 2,472
megawatts).
62. Id. at 164 (“[S]ince 2000, wind capacity in the United States has increased twentyfold to almost
50,000MW, while capacity in California has less than tripled.”). Troxler points out “that wind projects
developed in California and New England from 2009 through 2011 were significantly more expensive than
comparative projects in other regions,” with a cost in California and New England of $2,500 per kilowatt in
comparison to the national average of $2,160 per kilowatt. Id. at 177.
63. Id. at 165, 195 (positing that “[t]he combination of decentralized siting and stringent environmental
evaluation shrouds the cost, outcome, and timeline of the permitting process in uncertainty, chilling investment
in new [California wind] capacity” and concluding that “California could alleviate these barriers, without
necessarily detracting from environmental review, by centralizing permitting authority [for wind] in the
California Energy Commission and consolidating its licensing and environmental review process”).
64. 1974 Cal. Stat. 25005.5. Then California Governor, Ronald Reagan, vetoed the first version of the bill
in 1973. Larry Pryor, Reagan Under Fire for Veto of Energy Conservation Bill, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1973,
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
65. Energy Crisis Bill Gets an OK, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 1973, available at http://www.energy.
ca.gov/reports/Warren-Alquist_Act/history/1973-74_AB_1575_news.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review). The measure was instigated by a report from the Rand Corporation that “recommended that the state
should spend more time trying to conserve energy by increasing efficiency and less on just building new power
plants.” Id.
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conservation and environmental protection. California legislators placed the
authority to regulate the siting of electric power plants in the same agency that
67
was charged with researching energy conservation and new forms of energy.
Because this new agency had the power to look beyond traditional utility68
siting authority, the Los Angeles Times called it a “superagency.” The concept
69
of this superagency structure was alarming to some in the 1970s. Then
70
California Governor Ronald Reagan vetoed the first version of the bill, and
when he finally signed the legislation, the state energy coordinator resigned
71
warning that the commission was a “dangerous concentration of authority.” Yet
reviews of the Energy Commission’s performance have concluded that the
72
process works and is an appropriate balance of speed and oversight, allowing
power plants to be sited in an “expeditious and environmentally considerate
73
manner.”
B. Current Scope of the Energy Commission’s Jurisdiction
The current version of the Warren-Alquist Act is close to two hundred pages
long and incorporates twelve chapters, addressing everything from the
74
Commission’s management to its research programs. One of the most laudable
features of California’s energy regime is the legislative mandate, added to the
75
statute in 2002, requiring that the Energy Commission prepare an “integrated
76
energy policy report” every two years. The legislative charge is broad: the
Commission must “conduct assessments and forecasts of all aspects of energy
industry supply, production, transportation, delivery and distribution, demand,
and prices” and “use these assessments and forecasts to develop energy policies

66. See Superagency for the Energy Gap, supra note 11 (describing the powers of the proposed Energy
Resources Conservation and Development Commission, including siting authority for power plants,
conservation measures, and research and development of additional sources of energy).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Pryor, supra note 64 (describing the opposition of privately-owned utilities to the first version of the
Warren-Alquist bill).
70. Id.
71. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, supra note 19 (quoting California State Energy Coordinator
Wesley G. Bruer).
72. SUSAN F. TIERNEY & PAUL J. HIBBARD, SITING POWER PLANTS: RECENT EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA
AND BEST PRACTICES IN OTHER STATES 4 (2002), available at http://www.issuelab.org/click/download1/
siting_power_plants_recent_experience_in_california_and_best_practices_in_other_states (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
73. Power Plant Siting Proceedings FAQs, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/public_
adviser/power_plant_siting_faq.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
74. Warren-Alquist State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Act, CAL PUB. RES. CODE §
25000–990 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).
75. 2002 Cal. Stat. 3243.
76. PUB. RES. § 25302(a). The first report was required to be issued in 2003. Id. The most recent report
was issued in 2013. 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57.
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that conserve resources, protect the environment, ensure energy reliability,
77
enhance the state’s economy, and protect public health and safety.” One of the
objectives of the reporting requirement is “to encourage cooperation among the
78
various state agencies with energy responsibilities[,]” and creating the report
requires the Energy Commission to consult and coordinate with at least nine
79
other state agencies that have additional jurisdiction over energy issues.
Despite its coordinating role and broad mandate to “[s]erve as a central
80
repository within the state government” for energy data and recommendations,
81
the Energy Commission’s actual jurisdiction to make decisions is more limited.
Since the original enactment of the statute, the Energy Commission’s primary
jurisdiction is “the exclusive power to certify all sites and related facilities in the
82
state, whether . . . new . . . or a change or addition to an existing facility.”
A further limitation on the Energy Commission’s authority is that the
definition of “[f]acility” includes only an “electric transmission line or thermal
83
powerplant” “using any source of thermal energy, with a generating capacity of
84
50 megawatts [MW]or more . . . .” The statute explicitly states that “‘[t]hermal
powerplant’ does not include any wind, hydroelectric, or solar photovoltaic
85
electrical generating facility.”
86
As a result of this now seemingly irrational carve out, the Energy
Commission reported that “[m]ore than half of the 9,435 MW of large-scale
renewable generation permitted in 2010 fell under the purview of local

77. PUB. RES. § 25301(a).
78. Id. § 25300(e).
79. Id. §§ 25301(a), 25302(e). These agencies include (1) the Public Utilities Commission; (2) the Office
of Ratepayer Advocates; (3) the California Air Resources Board; (4) the Electricity Oversight Board; (5) the
Independent System Operator; (6) the Department of Water Resources; (7) the California Consumer Power and
Conservation Financing Authority; (8) the Department of Transportation; and (9) the Department of Motor
Vehicles. Id.
80. Id. § 2516.5(d) (The Energy Commission is to “[s]erve as a central repository within the state
government for the collection, storage, retrieval, and dissemination of data and information on all forms of
energy supply, demand, conservation, public safety, research, and related subjects. The data and information
shall be derived from all sources, including, but not be limited to, electric and gas utilities, oil and other energy
producing companies, institutions of higher education, private industry, public and private research laboratories,
private individuals, and from any other source that the commission determines is necessary to carry out its
objectives under this division.”).
81. See id. § 25216 (describing duties consisting largely of collecting data, making assessments and
recommendations, and performing research and development); id. § 25410.6 (describing the Energy
Commission’s role in administering the State Energy Conservation Assistance Account).
82. Id. § 25500.
83. Id. § 25110 (defining “[f]acility”).
84. Id. § 25120 (defining “[t]hermal powerplant”).
85. Id. § 25120. But cf. infra note 169 (discussing California Public Utilities Code section 25500.1).
86. At the time the Warren-Alquist Act was passed, utility-scale wind turbines had not yet been
developed. See, e.g., Energy Timelines: Wind, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/kids/energy.
cfm?page=tl_wind (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (indicating that the
first wind turbine capable of generating over one MW did not begin operating until 1979, and that it was not
until the 1980s that some of the first wind turbines were installed in California).
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governments” instead of the centralized Energy Commission process. In
comparison to the hundreds, if not thousands, of separate local governmental
88
entities from which renewable energy projects might need to seek approval, the
advantages of the Energy Commission permitting process described in Part IV,
help make a compelling argument that large-scale renewable projects should be
89
centralized under the Energy Commission’s jurisdiction.
IV. THE ENERGY COMMISSION’S ENERGY SITING PROCESS
Despite the carve-outs for wind and solar PV mentioned in Part III.B, the
Energy Commission’s authority is broad, and its certification process is
90
comprehensive. It all starts when an applicant files an application for
91
certification of a site. After receiving the application and reviewing it for
92
sufficiency, the Energy Commission takes the lead role in giving notice of the
application to the California Attorney General, relevant federal and state
93
agencies, and the public through newspaper publication.
Perhaps most significantly, however, the Energy Commission forwards the
application to “local governmental agencies having land use and related
jurisdiction in the area of the proposed site and related facility[,]” seeking review
and comments on “the design of the facility, architectural and aesthetic features
of the facility, access to highways, landscaping and grading, public use of lands
in the area of the facility, and other appropriate aspects of the design,
94
construction, or operation of the proposed site and related facility.” This step
satisfies the Energy Commission’s responsibility to ensure that a project
conforms to applicable federal, state, local, or regional laws, ordinances,
95
regulations, and standards (LORS). While the Energy Commission certification
process coordinates and considers all LORS, the Energy Commission’s

87. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 577, at 219.
88. See id. (reporting that California has 58 counties, 482 incorporated cities, and 3,400 special districts).
While special district approval might not often be required, Ken Alex noted that “local jurisdiction still has a lot
of control over where energy facilities are cited.” Ken Alex, Senior Policy Advisor, State of California, Office
of Governor & Director, State of California, Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Remarks at the
McGeorge Law Review Symposium: California’s Future and What Does the Environment Look Like? (Apr. 11,
2014).
89. See Troxler, supra note 9, at 170 (describing a wind project in Kern County that had to obtain
approval from eight local, four state, and three federal agencies).
90. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25500–43 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).
91. Id. § 25519(a).
92. See id. § 25520 (listing the required contents of the application).
93. Id. § 25519(g). The Energy Commission may also be required to notify the Public Utilities
Commission. Id. § 25519(j).
94. Id. § 25519(f).
95. Laws, Ordinances, Regulations and Standards in Siting Cases, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.
energy.ca.gov/public_adviser/lors_faq.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).

200

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 46
“exclusive power to certify” means the certificate it issues is “in lieu of” and
“supersedes” all LORS from other jurisdictions, including the federal
96
government when allowed.
The next phases of the site certification process include discovery and
97
analysis. The Energy Commission staff gathers data from all sectors and
prepares a Preliminary Staff Assessment and then a Formal Staff Assessment for
98
the two commissioners assigned to the application.
The following stage is one that sets the Commission certification process
apart: “[f]ormal evidentiary hearings are held . . . to hear the findings and
conclusions of the applicant, staff, intervenors, and other agencies through
written, oral and documentary testimony in order to make a decision based on
99
evidence.” In this formal quasi-adjudicatory process, all parties, including
approved intervenors, have an opportunity to submit sworn testimony and cross100
examine witnesses. Non-party members of the public are also “encouraged to
101
present oral and written comments.” The adjudicatory hearings must be
102
scheduled 90 to 240 days after the date the application is filed. To allow for
public input, the hearings are held in one of four major cities nearest the
proposed site and may also be held in the county in which the site will be
103
located. The Energy Commission has discretion to determine the number of
hearings and how they are to be conducted to “provide a reasonable opportunity
for the public and all parties . . . to comment upon the application and the
104
commission staff assessment . . . .” In fact, “public adviser[s]” are nominated
by the Energy Commission and appointed by the California Governor to educate
105
the public and encourage participation.
After the formal adjudicatory hearing or hearings on an application, the
Energy Commission must prepare a written decision concerning the application,
including “[s]pecific provisions relating to the manner in which the proposed
facility is to be designed, sited, and operated in order to protect environmental
106
quality and assure public health and safety” and “[a] discussion of any public
benefits from the project including, but not limited to, economic benefits,

96. PUB. RES. § 25500.
97. See Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.
energy.ca.gov/public_adviser/six_phases.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (listing discovery and analysis phases following the data adequacy phase).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. CAL. CODE OF REGS. tit. 20, § 1712(b) (2014).
101. Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, supra note 97; see also Power Plant Siting
Proceedings FAQs, supra note 73.
102. CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 25521 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. §§ 25217.1, 25222; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 20, §§ 2553, 2555.
106. PUB RES. § 25523(a).
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environmental benefits, and electricity reliability benefits.” The decision phase
starts with the “Presiding Member’s Proposed Decision” upon which one last
108
hearing is held to give the public an opportunity to comment. Ultimately, the
full Energy Commission renders a final decision at one of its regular bi-monthly
109
meetings.
As discussed below, the Commission process provides three significant
advantages for applicants and the public: (A) one-stop shopping; (B) an
alternative to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review
110
requirements; and (C) limited judicial review of a Energy Commission
certification.
A. One-Stop Shopping
In 1974, some proponents of the Warren-Alquist Act argued the legislation
was necessary because “it was virtually impossible for power plant builders to
secure the permission of the 33 agencies that [had] jurisdiction over location of
111
nuclear power plants in California.” In contrast, the Energy Commission’s
licensing procedure “provide[s] a comprehensive ‘one-stop’ process for
112
permitting thermal power plants larger than 50 MW . . . .” This one-stop
process can provide at least five advantages.
First, all applicants must go through the same well-defined Energy
113
Commission process. Although it might be criticized as “cookie cutter” because
it “makes all projects step through a very detailed, lengthy and exhaustive
114
process irrespective of the proposed impacts,” the precedents established by the
Energy Commission in other cases make the expectations and results fairly
115
predictable.

107. Id. § 25523(h).
108. Six Phases of the Power Plant Siting Process, supra note 97.
109. Id.
110. CEQA is modeled after the federal National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), and has a
similar two-step review process. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. & STATE OF CAL., GOVERNOR’S
OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH, NEPA AND CEQA: INTEGRATING STATE AND FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS 3 (drft. 2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/NEPA_CEQA_Draft_
Handbook_March_2013_0.pdf [hereinafter NEPA AND CEQA] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The
lead governmental agency conducting the review must make an initial determination if a full report, which in
California is called an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and is comparable to the federal Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS), is required. See id. 5–8 (describing the comparable processes of review under CEQA
and NEPA).
111. Big Energy Bill Signed by Reagan, supra note 19.
112. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 62.
113. See CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 25517 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (stating that a certification from the
Energy Commission must be obtained prior to constructing any thermal power plant).
114. E-mail from Dana C. Zentz, Vice President, Commercial Dev., Summit Power Group, LLC &
Managing Dir. & CEO, NorthLight Power, LLC, to author (May 12, 2014, 5:16 PM) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
115. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 72, at 28 (indicating that siting procedures are most efficient
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Second, placing the decision in the hands of a statewide agency with
expertise in various energy generation and conservation concerns and related
siting issues can increase the likelihood of “institutional competency to evaluate
116
applications.” This can protect the public from local authorities seeking to
“race-to-the-bottom” by sacrificing environmental or health values in hopes of
117
spurring economic development.
Third, the Energy Commission’s process can save an applicant money by
118
While the LORS
avoiding “duplication and regulatory uncertainty.”
requirements still mean an applicant’s lawyers will have to be familiar with the
requirements of each federal, state, or local law, ordinance, rule, or standard that
applies, legal counsel will not have to spend much face-time with each of the key
119
administrative personnel from several different jurisdictions. In addition, the
120
Energy Commission promises “predetermined” flat-fee pricing. The public also
benefit from the efficiency of having a single forum instead of needing to
121
monitor the project on multiple fronts and in multiple venues.
Fourth, the use of a statewide agency increases the likelihood of a “more
objective . . . review” that “mitigates the risk that decisions will over-emphasize
122
provincial concerns.” The larger land footprint required to generate power from
123
wind and solar PV sources may make it more likely a project would cross more
jurisdictional boundaries and potentially raise more provincial concerns.
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, a statewide agency with exclusive
jurisdiction, like the Energy Commission, has the additional advantage of
124
preemptive power. The Energy Commission’s alternative environmental review
process is described in Part IV.B. Although this process does not avoid any of the
other agencies that might otherwise be involved in a CEQA review, one benefit is
the Energy Commission’s energy focus: the Energy Commission has the ultimate
authority to decide whether the project should proceed even if there are impacts,
when prior agency decisions are made available to subsequent applicants, as in New York, California, and
Connecticut).
116. Troxler, supra note 9, at 189.
117. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (describing the risk of lax environmental review in a local
siting situation)
118. Power Plant Siting Proceedings FAQs, supra note 73.
119. See TIERNEY & HIBBARD, supra note 72, at 7 (indicating that other agencies provide
recommendations to the Energy Commission rather than directly to the applicant).
120. Troxler, supra note 9, at 194 (“[D]evelopers pay a flat fee of $255,075, plus $510 per MW at the
time of filing.”).
121. See CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25217.1, 25222 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (describing the role of the
advisers available to the public to assist during the Energy Commission siting process).
122. Troxler, supra note 9, at 189.
123. See SEAN ONG, ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LAND-USE
REQUIREMENTS FOR SOLAR POWER PLANTS IN THE UNITED STATES, at iv (2013), available at http://www.nrel.
gov/docs/fy13osti/56290.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing the “potentially significant
land use” associated with solar power plants).
124. See PUB RES. § 25500 (stating that Energy Commission siting jurisdiction preempts any other
statute, ordinance, or regulation).
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whereas other regulatory agencies may not be as interested in promoting the
125
state’s energy goals that may override environmental considerations.
Several states have moved to a statewide wind siting model to put wind
power generation on a level playing field with other power generation sources
126
that enjoy the benefits of a centralized permit process. Large-scale wind and
solar projects in California that do not have the option of permitting through the
Energy Commission process do not have these advantages.
B. Alternative CEQA Review
Virtually all energy projects in California, whether permitted under the
Energy Commission process or locally, require some sort of approval and
127
therefore are subject to CEQA environmental review requirements. However,
the Warren-Alquist Act allows the Energy Commission to conduct its own
environmental review that is then used “in the same manner as . . . an
environmental impact report or negative declaration prepared by a lead agency”
128
under the standard CEQA process.
The Energy Commission’s environmental review process is arguably more
129
rigorous than a CEQA review by other lead agencies. A standard CEQA review
is comparable to the environmental review process under the National
Environmental Policy Act: an agency or governmental body prepares an initial
study and if necessary, Environmental Impact Report through an informal
130
information gathering administrative process.
In contrast, the Energy
Commission certification process described above requires submission of
evidence, cross-examination, and testimony in a formal quasi-judicial
131
adjudicatory setting.

125. Telephone conference between author and Michael J. Levy, formerly Chief Counsel, California
Energy Commission (June 30, 2014). See also e-mail from Michael J. Levy, former Chief Counsel, California
Energy Commission, to author (Aug. 25, 2014, 2:21 PM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
126. See supra Part II (discussing the approaches of various states to energy siting issues).
127. Even though most energy facilities may not be public or publically funded projects, they are private
projects that require discretionary approval, so they are subject to CEQA requirements. PUB. RES. § 21080(a);
Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors of Mono Cnty., 8 Cal. 3d 247, 259 (1972).
128. PUB RES. § 25519(c). Consequently the California Secretary for Resources has certified the Energy
Commission’s process as a CEQA equivalent. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15251(j) (2014) (listing “[t]he power
plant site certification program of the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission
under Chapter 6 of the Warren-Alquist Act, commencing with Public Resources Code Section 25500“).
“Section 21080.5 of the Public Resources Code provides that a regulatory program of a state agency shall be
certified by the Secretary for Resources as being exempt from the requirements for preparing EIRs, negative
declarations, and initial studies if the Secretary finds that the program meets the criteria contained in that code
section. A certified program remains subject to other provisions in CEQA such as the policy of avoiding
significant adverse effects on the environment where feasible.” Id. § 15250.
129. See PUB. RES. §§ 25519 (a)(l), 25521 (describing the Energy Commission’s environmental review
process).
130. See NEPA AND CEQA, supra note 110.
131. See supra Part IV.
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Even with the CEQA-equivalent environmental review, in most cases the
Energy Commission is required to issue a written decision as to an application
132
“within 18 months of the filing of an application for certification . . . .” A
California Bureau of State Audits report showed that the average processing time
133
of applications during the 1990s was a shorter time period—fourteen months.
The CEQA requirements make permitting time for California projects longer
134
than in other states, and because wind projects do not benefit from the Energy
Commission review process, the additional time to meet CEQA requirements can
135
add significantly more delay. A 2013 J.D. candidate at Columbia Law School
conducted an unpublished survey of the experiences of eight wind farms in Kern
136
and Solano Counties in California from 2008 through 2011. In this survey, he
found that the time between filing a notice of preparation and the final CEQA
137
138
Environmental Impact Report ranged from 224 days to 1,508 days. Thus, in
139
contrast to states in which permitting can be completed in less than a year, the
140
California wind permitting process averages four years.
Furthermore, in contrast to NEPA, which simply lists environmental impacts
of a project, the CEQA process requires mitigation measures to address
141
“significant environmental effects” of proposed projects. While other lead
agencies can issue a “statement of overriding considerations” to allow a project
142
to go forward even if significant environmental effects are unavoidable, the

132. PUB. RES. § 25522(a). If the process to file a notice of intent set out in sections 25501.7 through
25516.6 applies, then the final decision must be within twelve months if an application “[wa]s filed within one
year of the commission’s approval of the notice of intent.” Id.
133. Troxler, supra note 9, at 194.
134. Robert D. Castro, Developing Wind Projects in California—or Anywhere, POWER MAG. (Dec. 15,
2007), http://www.powermag.com/developing-wind-projects-in-californiaor-anywhere/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
135. See E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, Partner, Stoel Rives, LLP, to author (May 8, 2014, 5:47 PM)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The CEC [Energy Commission] process is lengthy—18 to 24
months for a new facility, and it can take longer. While this is much longer than a local agency siting process in
a state like Oregon, it’s not that much longer than a local siting process (for a large project) in CA, where
CEQA compliance is required.”).
136. Troxler, supra note 9, at 181 n.144.
137. An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is comparable to an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
under NEPA. See, e.g., NEPA AND CEQA, supra note 110, at 8.
138. Troxler, supra note 9, at 181 n.144.
139. See STOEL RIVES, LLP, THE LAW OF WIND, pt. 2, at 2 (3d ed. 2006), available at http://www.stoel.
com/Files/LawOfWind_06.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that locally cited wind projects
take three to six months to work through the permitting process); NAT’L WIND COORDINATING COMM., SITING
SUBCOMM., PERMITTING OF WIND ENERGY FACILITIES 10 (rev. 2002), available at http://www.nationalwind.
org/assets/publications/permitting2002.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that permitting for
a wind project usually takes only twelve months).
140. CTRS. OF EXCELLENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL SCAN: WIND TURBINE TECHNICIANS IN CALIFORNIA 11
(2009), available at http://www.coeccc.net/environmental_scans/wind_scan_sw_09.pdf.
141. CAL. CODE REGS.tit. 14, §15091 (2014).
142. Id. § 15093.
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Commission alone can include “public convenience and necessity” as a basis for
143
overriding any state law, including CEQA requirements.
C. Limited Judicial Review
While not all wind developers in California agree that Energy Commission
review would be preferable to local permitting, there does appear to be consensus
on the advantage of at least one aspect of the Energy Commission process—
144
limited judicial review. Reconsideration of an Energy Commission decision
145
must occur, if at all, within 30 days after the adoption of a decision or order.
Furthermore, judicial review of an Energy Commission decision “on any
application for certification of a site and related facility” is limited to a petition
146
for writ of mandate directly to the Supreme Court of California. While a
handful of applicants have sought such a writ from the California Supreme
147
Court, that court has never ordered the Energy Commission to overturn a siting
decision perhaps because the Energy Commission must only adhere to the
rigorous certification process described above in order to meet the narrow
148
procedural review grounds set out in the Warren-Alquist Act. Furthermore, the
Act limits review to the certified record without any additional evidence,

143. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25525 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). While CEQA statements of overriding
considerations are common, the public convenience and necessity override of LORS has been used sparingly.
See, e.g., City Officials Disappointed by Power Plant Decision, CITY OF CARLSBAD (May 31, 2012),
http://news.carlsbadca.gov/news/city-officials-disappointed-by-234625 (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing the Energy Commission’s use of the public convenience and necessity override for a power
plant to be built in Carlsbad, California); Staff’s Brief on Override Issues, In re Application for Certification for
the Eastshore Energy Ctr. in Hayward by Tierra Energy of Texas, No. 06-AFC-6 (Cal. Energy Res.
Conservation and Dev. Comm’n Dec. 7, 2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/sitingcases/eastshore/
documents/lors_override/ENERGY_COMMISSION_STAFFS_BRIEF_ON_OVERRIDE_2007-12-07_TN43634.PDF (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (briefing the Energy Commission’s authority to override
LORS).
144. Compare E-mail from Dana C. Zentz, supra note 114 (describing the drawbacks of Energy
Commission siting for smaller projects), with E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135 (“So, in my
experience, the true process benefits come from the lack of judicial review of CEC [Energy Commission]
decisions, as opposed to a faster processing timeline.”). Castaños amended her earlier email to clarify that the
California Supreme Court has granted review, it just “has never reversed a CEC [Energy Commission] siting
decision.” E-mail form Kristen T. Castaños, Partner, Stoel Rives, LLP, to author (Sept. 5, 2014, 6:24 PM) (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
145. PUB. RES. § 25530. Reconsideration may be on the Energy Commission’s own motion or upon
petition of any party. Id.
146. Id. § 25531(a), (c).
147. See, e.g., Santa Teresa Citizens Action Grp v. Cal. Energy Comm’n, 105 Cal. App. 4th 1441 (2003).
148. PUB. RES. § 25531(b) (“The review shall not be extended further than to determine whether the
commission has regularly pursued its authority . . . . No new or additional evidence may be introduced upon
review and the cause shall be heard on the record of the commission as certified by it. The review shall not be
extended further than to determine whether the commission has regularly pursed its authority . . . . The findings
and conclusions of the commission on questions of fact are final and are not subject to review . . . .”).
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providing that the Energy Commission’s “findings and conclusions . . . on
149
questions of fact are final and are not subject to review . . . .”
In contrast, one of the biggest uncertainties of current wind siting is whether
150
the project will be subject to protracted litigation. If a local agency’s CEQA
approval is challenged, the trial portion can take over a year, and the entire
151
process can take up to four years or more with appeals. Compare this litigation
risk with an Energy Commission project that is “essentially ready to go”
152
immediately after the Energy Commission’s licensing decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Arguments against a superagency solution for renewable energy sources
come from both developers and the Energy Commission itself. From a
developer’s perspective, if there is local support for a project, a standardized
153
statewide siting process could create additional hurdles and delays.
The problem with the local approach for large-scale wind and PV projects is
154
that the locations where developers can easily build may be running out. In
addition, local agency support does not necessarily shield a project from
155
litigation by other groups opposing a project. Finally, speedy site approval may

149. Id.
150. John Watts, Reconciling Environmental Protection with the Need for Certainty: Significance
Thresholds for CEQA, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 216–17 (1995). The Cape Wind project in Massachusetts is also
a poster child for the problems of litigation opposing a wind project. See Cape Wind, Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management, http://www.boem.gov/Renewable-Energy-Program/Studies/Cape-Wind.aspx (last visited Nov.
16, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the progress of the Cape Wind Energy Project
proposed in 2001, which is still being litigated thirteen years later).
151. E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135.
152. Id.
153. Some developers have signaled their desire to avoid Energy Commission review by scaling their
projects just below the Commission’s 50 MW jurisdictional limit. See, e.g., Salton Sea & Renewable Energy
Facilities, CAL. STATE SENATE SELECT COMM. ON CAL. ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, http://caei.senate.ca.
gov/sites/caei.senate.ca.gov/files/company%20bios%2010-1-13.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (describing Energy Source’s 49.9 MW facility). “The caveat to all this is, the length of
time a project’s permitting takes depends a lot on the local agency, their relative experience with similar
projects, and the complexities of the project. There are solar and wind projects that are so well-sited, in
jurisdictions with sophisticated staff, with minimal environmental impacts and no opponents, and those can be
processed by an experienced local agency relatively quickly (6-9 months). For non-controversial projects with
minimal impacts, a developer would probably benefit from a local siting process.” E-mail from Kristen T.
Castaños, supra note 135. See also e-mail from Megan Day, Senior Project Planner, Juwi Solar Inc., to author
(May 8, 2014, 3:24 PM) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (agreeing that there may be a role for a
statewide agency for larger facilities (wind or solar PV) that may encounter NIMBYism, because they might
otherwise not get approval at all; but, that if there is local support, then local permitting is, in fact, more
streamlined and efficient than statewide commissions).
154. See Salkin & Ostrow, supra note 9, at 1068 (indicating that “local opposition to wind turbines . . . is
common” and that some areas have gone so far as to enact moratoria on wind turbines).
155. Cf. supra Part IV.C (describing the comparative litigation-related benefits of the Energy
Commission’s siting process).
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156

not be best if environmental review is sacrificed. Because California requires
CEQA review for all large-scale renewable projects, the time savings are not
157
significant, and statewide siting would better ensure consistency of protections.
From the Energy Commission’s perspective, a 2011 report on renewable
development suggests renewable energy sources are distinct:
California has 482 incorporated cities and 58 counties with about 3,400
special districts that are “separate local government(s) that delivers [sic]
a limited number of public services to a geographically limited area.”
Because each jurisdiction has different population sizes, demographics,
geography, and renewable resource potential, implementing a one-sizefits-all energy policy for renewable development is impossible and
unproductive. . . . Demographic differences such as income and
education levels, political leanings, and value placed on renewable
energy also play a role, as do geographic differences that affect the type
of renewable resource best suited for each jurisdiction. State government
will need to work closely with local jurisdictions to understand these
differences and the unique challenges local governments face in pursuing
renewable energy policies and practices, and provide assistance in
158
overcoming those challenges.
One explanation for this language could be that the Energy Commission was
merely commenting on the current decentralized structure of permitting and
siting of renewable resources, and not attempting to make any recommendations.
Another explanation is that the Energy Commission meant to be addressing only
159
small-scale energy projects,
treating them consistently with any other
generation source that does not fall into the 50 MW and greater window
160
regulated by the Energy Commission.
However, one of the California governor’s “[k]ey [a]ctions to [d]ecarbonize”
is the goal of “[f]ully integrat[ing] renewable generation sources into the
electrical grid without [the] building of additional fossil fuel back-up generating
161
162
capacity.”
Thus, a “more anticipatory approach”
of viewing energy

156. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2007 & Supp. 2014) (subjecting only projects to be carried
out by a public agency or subject to public agency approval to CEQA).
157. E-mail from Kristen T. Castaños, supra note 135 (indicating that the local siting process is not
dramatically faster than the Energy Commission citing process when CEQA compliance is required).
158. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 219–20 (emphasis added).
159. However, this language appears in the section entitled “Cross-Cutting Issue 2: Local Government
Coordination,” which does not explicitly refer only to smaller renewable projects. Id.
160. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (explaining the current siting jurisdiction of the
Energy Commission).
161. CALIFORNIA @ 50 MILLION, supra note 53, at 16–17.
162. Wiseman et al., supra note 22, at 905.
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development through a more regional energy-shed lens, might avoid the
164
“consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts.”
The Energy Commission could play a role in achieving the goal of fully
integrating all energy sources, including renewable resources. The Energy
Commission could use its authority to make recommendations about how to best
regulate California’s diverse energy resources, and it could use its integrated
planning process as a vehicle for evaluating and addressing possible
165
improvements.
Yet the Energy Commission’s 2013 Integrated Energy Policy Report makes
no mention of including solar PV or wind siting within the Energy Commission’s
166
centralized siting jurisdiction. Considering the advantages to placing all largescale energy projects, not just thermal projects, under the Energy Commission
process, why has California not stepped up to its role model status by doing so?
The Energy Commission’s hesitancy to make this recommendation cannot be
attributed to a lack of expertise about renewable technologies. The Energy
Commission is currently responsible for siting concentrating solar thermal
projects, and the agency now has experience with large scale PV because of
167
Senate Bill 226 (SB 226). “Several large-scale solar thermal projects already
permitted at the state level [were] switching to PV technologies due to the
168
decreasing cost of PV as compared to solar thermal technologies.” SB 226
granted a short-term expansion of Energy Commission jurisdiction to consider a
set group of these projects but has not expanded that jurisdiction to include future
169
solar PV projects. In addition, even though the Energy Commission may not

163. Comparable to the evolution of viewing water regulation through a watershed, as opposed to a
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction lens.
164. Outka supra note 15, at 283 (“A reactive regulatory structure [to utility plans] inevitably leads to
consistent and pervasive neglect of cumulative impacts.”) While the focus of this article has been on large-scale
renewable energy siting, an argument could be made that even small-scale projects have detrimental cumulative
impacts. One example is the California ISO “duck curve” model, which suggests problems meeting customer
demand if too much solar power from southfacing panels are produced. See CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, FAST
FACTS: WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT MANAGING A GREEN GRID 3 (2013), available at
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FlexibleResourcesHelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review). One possible solution to this problem might be to integrate the siting of solar panels
and orient more to the west “so they capture more late afternoon sunlight, while foregoing greater overall
generation.” Jeff St. John, Retired CPUC Commissioner Takes Aim at CAISO’s Duck Curve, GREEN TECH GRID
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/retired-cpuc-commissioner-takes-aim-at-caisosduck-curve (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
165. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (describing the Energy Commission’s role in
collecting data and making recommendations).
166. 2013 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57.
167. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 220 (“Senate Bill 226 . . . allows
permitted projects larger than 50 MW that switch from solar thermal electric to PV to undergo an Energy
Commission license amendment rather than a new permitting and environmental review process conducted by
local government.”); id. at 44 fig.7 (showing large-scale PV and solar thermal projects permitted in 2010).
168. Id. at 220.
169. See id. (“Senate Bill 226 . . . allows permitted projects larger than 50 MW that switch from solar
thermal electric to PV to undergo an Energy Commission license amendment rather than a new permitting and
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have expertise about wind energy generating technologies, it presumably would
be in a better position to hire employees with that expertise than would local
170
jurisdictions with more limited budgets.
The Energy Commission’s hesitancy to recommend centralization of
renewable energy siting cannot be attributed to lack of knowledge about the
many difficulties renewable energy developers encounter in this area. In a 2011
report, the Energy Commission raised a number of concerns about “[f]ragmented
or overlapping licensing authority,” noting “[w]hen involved agencies cannot
agree on a set of mitigation or licensing conditions, developers have to satisfy
more than one set of conditions, submit duplicate information, or face delays
171
while agencies attempt to come to agreement.”
One explanation for the Energy Commission’s hesitancy might be a concern
that recommending an expansion of its own jurisdiction would seem
overreaching. The Energy Commission may also be concerned about treading on
a generally popular concept—local control. Both of these concerns seem to be
reflected in the way the Energy Commission supported its recommendation for
temporarily taking control of the handful of solar PV projects covered by SB
226: “Without SB 226, the addition of these projects, combined with the
increased number of PV project applications and the continuing economic
downturn, could have strained local governments’ ability to process all the
172
applications.”
environmental review process conducted by local government.”). It only covers applicants that petitioned the
Energy Commission before June 30, 2012 to convert a proposed solar thermal power plant to a PV plant. CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 25500.1(a) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). Projects on federal land must also have been certified
by the Department of the Interior or Bureau of Land Management before September 1, 2011. Id.
170. 2011 INTEGRATED ENERGY POLICY REPORT, supra note 57, at 220 (“Local governments may lack
the regulatory framework and technical expertise to address the growing number and diversity of renewable
energy technologies.”).
171. Id. at 9. Distributed generation (mostly solar PV) faces even more hurdles:
[T]he wide variation in standards, codes, and fees among local governments make it difficult for
developers to meet permit requirements. Land-use requirements for identical systems can vary
significantly form jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Fees also vary widely among municipalities and even
within municipalities for the same system size, and are often based on project cost rather than staff
time needed for permit review, with many municipalities exceeding estimated cost recovery fees.
Developers must also get permit approvals from local fire departments, building and electric code
officials, and local air districts, leading to duplication and inefficiency in the permit application
process. Finally, while distributed generation projects are subject an environmental review under the
California Environmental Quality Act and in some cases the National Environmental Protection Act,
many local permitting agencies only have thorough environmental screening and review processes in
place for traditional development and are ill-prepared to assess environmental impacts associated
with renewable distributed generation.
Id.
The 2011 Report disappointingly only notes that it has provided guides to local agencies. Id. at 221
(explaining that the 2010 Energy Commission Energy Aware Facility Siting and Permitting Guide “provides
suggestions for permit process streamlining, including one-stop permit centers, pre-application packages and
conferences, simplified permit language, a single point of contact for all local permits, cross training of staff,
and the use of program-level EIRs [to satisfy CEQA]”).
172. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
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As the fracking stories referenced in the introduction to this article illustrate,
there is pushback in many parts of the country against statewide control. Despite
the concerns over creating a superagency in 1974, the opposition against
173
centralization may be even more pronounced in some areas today. However,
recent legislation that has included large-scale wind facilities within the
jurisdiction of statewide siting agencies means that centralization is plausible, at
174
least in some areas.
Furthermore, whatever the hesitations, it makes little sense to provide a
statewide streamlined siting process for conventional thermal power plants,
which have more detrimental impacts on the environment, while making the
cleaner renewable energy power plants jump through additional hurdles and costs
that prevent investment in these technologies. In conclusion, this article urges the
Energy Commission to explore a superagency solution for all large-scale energy
projects, including all large-scale renewable energy projects.

173. In fact, much of environmental reform was coming not from local governments but from the federal
level during this period.
174. See, e.g., 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 469.
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